In recent years, the European Union has taken steps to strengthen transparency and accountability in how foreign interests seek to influence EU decision-making. The Directive on Transparency of Third-Country Interest Representation is a central part of this effort, designed to ensure that lobbying activities carried out on behalf of non-EU governments or entities are visible and subject to oversight. Last week, the European Parliament adopted its position on the draft Directive, which still requires negotiation and final approval before becoming EU law.
The aim of the Directive is to safeguard democratic integrity by ensuring that foreign influence in EU decision-making is visible and accountable. It requires organizations acting as paid representatives of non-EU governments to register and disclose key information about their activities, but it explicitly exempts routine civil society work, academic research, media services, and general foreign funding unrelated to lobbying. Importantly, the directive’s text and accompanying statements from EU lawmakers stress that registration should not result in negative labelling or create a “climate of distrust” towards NGOs, distinguishing it from repressive “foreign agent” laws that exist elsewhere.
European CSOs have underscored unresolved risks: key terms such as “service,” “third-country sponsor,” and the scope of excluded civil society activities remain insufficiently defined, and safeguards like the ban on criminal sanctions lack clear implementation guarantees. These ambiguities leave wide room for hostile governments to stretch the Directive during transposition. Even with improvements in the Parliament’s position, the risk of misuse against civil society remains significant.
The directive’s implementation raises important considerations for civil society particularly in countries like the Western Balkans and Turkey, where governments have a troubling history of exploiting transparency measures to stigmatise, restrict, and silence independent organisations. The mere existence of an EU-level register could be misinterpreted by illiberal actors as an endorsement of “foreign agent” regimes, providing a pretext for similar repressive laws at the national level. In nearby Georgia, for example, proponents of a controversial “foreign influence” bill falsely claimed that the EU itself wanted a law “similar to” their own, demonstrating how EU-level transparency measures can be weaponised as propaganda to justify crackdowns on civic space.
For enlargement countries, the Directive’s development carries added weight. Governments routinely reference EU alignment to justify domestic legislation, and EU conditionality on rule of law and civic space is unevenly enforced. How this Directive is communicated and transposed will shape not only transparency rules, but also the broader environment for civil society in accession processes.
What can CSOs do?
To protect civic space and ensure the directive is implemented properly, civil society organisations should take several steps:
- Proactively educating stakeholders about what the directive does and does not cover is essential. Many may be worried by sensationalist media headlines, so clarifying that normal NGO work and core funding are exempt, and highlighting the directive’s safeguards against stigmatisation, can help dispel myths and counter misinformation.
- Tracking how officials and state-aligned media frame the Directive and intervene fast when it is misrepresented as endorsing “foreign agent” laws, issuing concise rebuttals to block its use as narrative cover for restrictive legislation.
- Engaging in the national transposition and implementation process is also crucial; participating in consultations and advocating for strong protections and clear definitions in national law can help ensure that professional lobbying is differentiated from civic advocacy.
- Insisting on meaningful exemptions and independent oversight mechanisms, and offering to help draft guidance on ambiguous criteria, can further strengthen safeguards.
The directive has the potential to strengthen democratic accountability if implemented with care. However, its risks for countries where civic space is fragile and governments may misuse transparency measures, cannot be ignored. By following these recommendations, civil society organisations can help ensure that the directive serves its intended purpose: defending democracy, not diminishing the vibrant civil society that is its backbone.